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Introduction 
In 1989, Al Gore stated that ‘we are witnessing an unprecedented and massive 
collision between our civilization and the Earth’ (Gore, 1989). Not only is our way 
of life at risk from emerging environmental threats and the conflicts they might 
engender; these threats are themselves the result of anthropogenic planetary 
changes. This interwoven story of humans and the global environment is a classic 
example of what we might call a form of planetary thinking or a condition of 
globality. Indeed, much of the literature on climate change assumes that a global 
environmental threat needs to be matched by global political tools and policies.  
 The one-world quality of environmental reasoning re-asserts the 
attractiveness of globalization (as process) and appeals to thinking globally. 
Globalization is classically thought of in terms of the growing expansion of 
international governance, increasingly mobile economic networks and the 
development of technologies that enable time-space compression. Globality, 
however, is often defined as a condition, a way of thinking on a planetary scale that 
is beyond globalization. While often signified in a singular form, a planetary 
condition of interconnectedness between natural and social systems can be 
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deconstructed to reveal multiple political constitutions and contestations (van 
Munster and Sylvest, this volume). As Tsing (2000: 353) writes more broadly: 
‘globalisms themselves need to be interrogated as an interconnected, but not 
homogeneous, set of projects.’ Globality is only possible within a particular 
historical conjunction of ideas that enable global spaces to emerge as objects of 
political concern (Bartelson, 2010).1  
 One notable absence in accounts of globality is that they often assume a 
human globality that neglects the centrality of the planet’s physical, chemical and 
natural systems (van Munster and Sylvest, this volume). By contrast, debates about 
the Anthropocene have foregrounded attention to the human role in shaping the 
earth’s environments as well as the vulnerability of humans to natural forces. 
Popularized from the work of Crutzen (2002), Steffen et al. (2007) and Ruddiman 
(2005), the Anthropocene has since become a shorthand for people discussing a 
new-found connection, an almost dialectical relationship, between humans and 
environmental processes that considers both the precarity of the planet as well as 
that of life on the planet (van Wyck and Hird, this volume; see also Clark, 2010; 
2014; Hird, 2010). Yet this vision of radical interconnectedness, a new argument 
for globality, is predicated on a great deal of debate about what exactly this means 
in practice and whether Anthropocene thinking (or the Anthropocenic gaze, 
Wahlberg, 2014) is radically different from thinking globally, carefully or 
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resiliently, or indeed whether it simply invokes a reformed ‘natural-scientific 
universalism’ (Baucom, 2012).  
 The issue of climate change is a privileged analytical entry point for 
interrogating the connection between globality and the Anthropocene in more 
detail. While discourses of climate change have re-focused attention on human-
environment interconnectedness, they do not simply embrace an Anthropocenic 
view. Rather, they have engendered many different types of global thinking of 
which ‘Anthropocenic globality’ is only one. Hence, this chapter argues that there is 
a multiplicity of global climate problems at stake, from concerns about rising 
anthropogenic emissions increases to claims for justice and equity; from protecting 
national security to calls for a new cultural renaissance with nature to live within 
the Anthropocene. Each of these problem-frames enacts ‘global climate change’ in 
a different way and calls for a wide array of interventions with diverse, sometimes 
overlapping and sometimes contradictory consequences. 
 From this I draw a simple conclusion: climate change is not a singular 
problem. Climate change is enacted as a problem through different assemblies of 
practices, sciences, interventions, policies and ideas. Even given the tight coupling 
of science and policy in many climate change debates, these are not all referring to 
the same ontological reality to be managed, but rather have different goals and 
new entities in sight.2  To develop the multiple climatic globalities argument, I first 
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briefly review some of the ways we might discuss the assembling of the problems 
of climate change (Blok, 2014) and the conceptual tools that may be of value. I then 
go on to deploy two separate analytical cuts. First, I consider how in the post-war 
period energy efficiency has been put forward as a solution to both global cooling 
(1970s) and global warming (1990s). Interestingly, the solution comes to 
legitimize very different worldviews within its enactment of a global climate. 
Second, I consider different proposed solutions to global warming and show how 
these emerge from different climatic artefacts, policies, practices and 
performances. The chapter concludes by offering some reflections on how to 
politically engage multiple climatic globalities.  
 
Assembling Climate Change 
Hulme (2009) and Malone (2009) have done extensive and very productive work 
in exploring the different ways in which climate change is framed as an issue. 
Malone (2009) for instance shows that the majority of climate change framings 
coalesce around the broad idea that more modernization will help solve this 
environmental issue, even if this does not diminish the continued vitality in other 
networks of more ethical, political, justice, and even skeptical based discourses. It 
can be very tempting to relate these different discourses as merely different views 
of essentially the same problem. A brief look at the history of modern 
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environmentalism, however, suggests that we need to go beyond accounts of a 
singular global climate condition. Some scholars have pinned environmentalism to 
a counter-cultural movement, originating particularly in the 1960s with the 
popularity of tracts like Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and the revival of 
ecotheological discourse (Anker, 2013). Others instead argued that Cold War 
military politics and technologies have shaped the development of global 
environmental science (Hamblin, 2013; Masco, 2010).  
 Climate globalities can be both militarized and countercultural in origin 
exactly because they are not representative of a singular global climate condition. 
They express and engender multiple competing agendas, which are held together 
in a way that sometimes has greater friction and sometimes less so. Diverse 
assemblings of environmental concerns involve different practices, ways-of-living 
and have different political implications. Once we accept that global environmental 
issues, and climate change specifically, are multiply constituted through diverse 
scientific-political assemblages, the focus on trying to find the best solution (which 
view is the right one and how can we communicate it and act on it) shifts to asking 
a series of profound questions about how the assemblages are formed and partake 
in the politics of globality: In whose interests are globalities made? What kinds of 
practices are they enacted through/with? What kinds of materials, technologies, 
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ecologies, and philosophies do they draw on? And what are the frictions created 
between these different networks?  
 To study the assembling of environmental issues and to draw out the 
multiple politics of globality, I draw inspiration from two bodies of literature. The 
first comes from Annemarie Mol’s (2002; 2008) work exploring the multiplicity of 
the body in practice. Here I draw from Mol’s (2002) work on the body in medical 
practice, which suggests that the variety of practices regarding atherosclerosis re-
makes the body and disease not as a singular entity neither as pluralist bodies. Mol 
(2002) rather suggests ‘the body multiple’ – more than one, less than many. She 
delinks the question of what to do from the question of what is real and argues that 
this ‘politics-of-what’ must ‘assume that the end points of trials, the goals sought 
for, are political in character’ (Mol 2002: 175). Politics opens up questions rather 
than solving them through facts or argument.   
 Lahsen’s (2009) ethnographic engagement with scientists and policymakers 
in different ministries in Brazil shows how Mol’s argument about ‘the body 
multiple’ can be used to understand how climate science is multiply constituted in 
these political environments in very different ways. For example, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology remained much more skeptical of the ‘Western’ science on 
the Amazon being a carbon sink that appeared to legitimate the emergence of 
financial mechanisms to avoid deforestation, while those close to the large scale 
7 
 
biosphere-atmospheric experiment in the Amazon – including the media, the IPCC 
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
negotiating teams, and the majority of the Brazilian government – supported the 
scientists’ idea of the Amazon as a great carbon sink. While part of this is about the 
interplay of local and international politics, the interesting point is that the science 
of what the Amazon is (a carbon sink or not) is tied together with these political 
reasonings – to use Sheila Jasanoff’s (2006) language one can say these are co-
produced. Lahsen’s (2009) conclusion can be extended more broadly to embrace 
many aspects of climate change science; witness the debates between 
paleoclimatologists and contemporary climate modelers, the different 
communities within the IPCC (Hulme and Mahony, 2010) or the recent friction 
about the uncertainties in the latest IPCC’s assessment report (Maslin and Austin, 
2012). Scientists, in other words, do not unite around a singular climatic or 
Anthropocenic globality.3 
 The second inspiration comes from Marieke de Goede’s (2012) use of 
assemblage theory in her account of terrorist financing. Here, de Goede argues that 
terrorist finance is an interweaving of ‘culture, material praxis and calculative 
technology’, which come together to ‘make government possible’ (de Goede, 2012: 
31). Applying her insights to studying climate change, we cannot simply separate 
out a real climate that is represented discursively in multiple ways. We need to 
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trace the connections over disparate times and spaces, materials and discourses – 
the ‘circulating references’ (Latour, 1987) – around which climate change 
assemblages are gathered and enacted. There is thus a certain constitutive or 
performative element of these assemblages in the diverse ways they materialize 
climate change. As I will argue, different ways of assembling climate change create 
their own definitions of the climate change that is imagined as being at risk or 
incomplete and in need of a solution. 
 Benson’s (2012) exploration of the Argos satellite-based environmentally 
monitoring and surveillance system helps to illustrate this point. He shows that 
while the technological infrastructure provides a singular platform, it enables a 
multiplicity of visions, uses, and practices with the data. This is because Argos 
needs customers (scientific and government primarily) to grow the commercial 
value of its market. The prioritization of challenges to be dealt with in the system 
changes over time as it is shaped by interest groups representing the most 
valuable customers, in most recent years, actors interested in climate change. Thus 
within the space of this technology, there is no uniform user or policy that emerges 
from this. Indeed one can argue this more broadly about climate modeling, as the 
‘infrastructural globalism’ involved in making global data and making data global 
are deployed in a wide diversity of ways by policymakers (Edwards, 2010). 
Fixations on climate targets are counterposed with fears that models can never 
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deliver one answer, not to mention the ways in which climate models have re-
shaped and been re-shaped by changing expectations and modeling in weather 
forecasting too. Even if a global imagination of the Anthropocene is advanced, a 
singular politics does not emerge. 
  
Multiple Climatic Globalities 1: Agreeing Solutions 
If the Anthropocene is said to re-awaken attention to the historical importance of 
human-environment relations, it is useful to consider how solutions to the 
problems of human impacts are woven together in different time-periods to 
different concerns. This is an important way of getting at the question of the 
politics of globality and challenging the singularity that a global environmental 
ethic is often said to invoke. One oft-noted historical feature of climate change 
debates is the interest in and discussion of global cooling futures, particularly in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The popular fascination with the potential arrival of a new 
ice age was captured in popular books such as Calder’s (1974) The Weather 
Machine and global cooling influenced attitudes to global atmospheric changes in 
important ways (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Calder’s Projection of a New Ice Age 
REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT 
Climate change could reduce food availability, enhance floods or droughts or 
failures in monsoons, threatening everyday life and likely leading to large political 
unrest. This was sometimes tinged with a Cold War fear that perhaps the Soviets 
(or the Americans) might be deliberately engineering the environment. Climate 
became endowed with cultural power, an idea that would re-shape and re-
formulate a wide array of other discourses (Ross, 1991). 
 Many responses to global cooling focused on the potential need to increase 
CO2 emissions in the atmosphere, an argument that traces historically back to for 
example Svante Arrhenius in the late nineteenth century who suggested that the 
planet might need heating up to save humanity (Fleming, 1998). More industrial 
civilization could be just the answer to the climatic crisis. But as insecurity arose 
about the direction of future climate changes, cooling as well as warming rhetoric 
could be deployed to argue for the same kind of solutions. In other words, 
solutions could be multiply deployed to both warming and cooling.  
 A good example of this can be found in a 1977 book published under the 
auspices of The Impact Team and bound with two CIA reports as appendices. The 
underriding fear in The Weather Conspiracy (The Impact Team, 1977) was of the 
dawning of a new ice age which would be hastened if society did not rapidly move 
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to low carbon pathways. While the book tried to avoid radical views towards 
warming or cooling, it erred on the side of making policy changes precisely as a 
precautionary measure in the event of an oncoming ice age describing the climate 
of the 1940s to 1970s as unprecedented and abnormally good for civilization and 
likely to be swiftly followed by cooling.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Warmer or Colder?4 
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The proposed solution for the report’s authors was energy efficiency. To prevent 
future climatic changes, individuals should take simple solutions to reduce their 
energy consumption and thus reduce the future risks from environmental changes. 
Readers are advised to consider fuel-efficient cars and driving strategies, as well as 
car-pooling; at home, readers should install insulation, thermostat controls and 
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lower energy light bulbs, take showers rather than baths, and they should lead the 
way on recycling and reducing waste. As the report states ‘Each of us can, and 
should, save energy in other ways every day’ (The Impact Team, 1977: 139). All of 
this occurs in the name of protecting civilization from global climatic changes. 
Interestingly, the end of the report incorporated an open list of organizations to 
contact if the reader wished ‘to become a crusader’ (Impact Team, 1977: 141) for 
the cause. Fighting global climate change was a war against history, in this case the 
history of ice ages (and so prior the Anthropocene). 
 I could draw from a very extensive range of literature to equally show how 
the same energy efficiency and reduced consumption solutions equally go to 
support the ‘fight’ against global warming and that the idea of a crusade, war or 
fight against climate change is undiminished (Hulme, 2009). In the case of global 
warming, however, the same policies are wrapped up into a rather different vision 
of the climate at risk – one that is warmer on average rather than cooler, and one 
in which the next ice age is rather less a concern than the rapidly rising 
temperatures that may trigger extreme events. Interestingly, in the case of 
warming discourses, the normal climate is frequently judged to be pre-industrial 
temperature since that is what international climate policy is compared to (how 
many degrees of warming above pre-industrial temperature), while for cooling 
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discourses it was preventing normal weather (ice ages) in the interest of 
preserving our abnormally warm conditions. 
 Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ is representative of the concern with rising 
temperatures, as his presentation of solutions (energy efficient cars, renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, carbon capture and storage, cycling and public 
transportation solutions) is couched in the language of ecological modernization 
and green growth (Luke, 2008). Gore likewise sets this out as a moral challenge 
and it is consistent with his earlier 1989 warning that climate change would be 
dealt with internationally at a point when countries became concerned about their 
future security. Gore’s climate warriors then adopt the same policies as the 
crusaders of The Impact Team, but for an entirely different climatic goal: the 
prevention of global warming in the Anthropocene. 
 Policies and science on climate change are not tied together so tightly that 
they cannot be unwoven and rewoven in various different ways. Reducing energy 
consumption works whether the goal is to prevent cooling or warming – there is a 
unity around the practice, even while the at-risk planetary status differs. The 
climatic goal is vastly different (prevent warming or cooling), although both share 
a desire to preserve a good climate for humanity to flourish.  
 
Multiple Climatic Globalities 2: Disagreeing Solutions 
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Similar solutions can be attached to different end goals, hence the politics of 
globality is not singular, but multiple. If we turn the analysis now to proposed 
solutions to global warming, we will also see another set of multiple globalities at 
work. If global warming, as climate change, is the predominant problem today 
amidst a catalogue of human impacts on the environment, it is not a singular 
problem for which people simply propose different kinds of solutions. Rather, 
there are a number of different climate change assemblages or groups of practices 
of ‘solutions’ that enact particular problem-solution formations, that variously 
overlap or conflict with other formations. It is through these frictions that the 
multiple politics of globality become visible. 
  Blok (2014) argues that there are ‘multiple climatic problems’ and presents a 
series of problematizations; interdependent areas in which a problem becomes 
delineated and made potentially resolvable, but which do not encompass nor 
accrue to a form of totalizing climate change governance. This has important 
implications for how we think about the emergence of an idiom of global 
stewardship within an Anthropocenic imagination. Here I explore three sites in 
brief (individual behavioral change, market led actions and climate security) in 
relation to the good outcome envisioned in these assemblages.  
 Climate change has been highlighted as a global economic issue in reports 
that show the economic advantage of investing money now in carbon emissions 
15 
 
reduction to prevent future high costs from climate damages (Stern, 2007). This 
constructs a global economic entity that is vulnerable to climate change, but also a 
global climate vulnerable to the output of the economy. A simple cost-benefit 
equation, however, does not work in the economic interests of all countries 
involved in the climate policy negotiations. Some benefit and others lose from 
future climate change scenarios, with the increase in global temperature up to 2 
degrees Celsius considered to be economically optimal or at least not detrimental 
to global GDP because of the opening up of large grain areas in Russia and North 
America. This poses a problem for those arguing that carbon dioxide emissions 
should be reduced to the lowest possible level as it is not in the global economic 
interest to do so (Randalls, 2011a). For global climatic governance, the national 
economy (as GDP) has to be reshaped into a global entity to then be managed 
efficiently with common parlance including terms like ‘cost-effectiveness’, 
‘internalizing externalities’ and the ‘market as the ideal information processor’. 
 Carbon markets have been the dominant solution to this economic problem.  
They assemble sets of calculations and models of carbon emissions within a 
financial trading environment (MacKenzie, 2009) where the ticker price for the 
credits becomes a source of profit as much as of concerted efforts to reduce 
emissions. Paterson and Stripple (2012) deploy the term ‘virtuous carbon’ to 
emphasize the ways in which virtuality and morality are entwined in carbon 
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markets such that the moral goodness of carbon trading to ‘save the planet’ 
outweighs specific critiques of market failures. But the reshaping of national 
economies goes beyond carbon markets, as climate change has become a hook to 
tie to a variety of economic interests. Janković and Bowman (2013) have argued 
that many businesses now require the continual proliferation of fears and 
concerns about climate change to continue stimulating and incentivizing the 
growth of the climate business sector. Indeed they suggest that ‘it seems green 
investment is becoming not so much a solution but an end in itself’ (Janković and 
Bowman 2013: 252). Likewise, Funk (2014) has traced a diverse set of ways in 
which businesses are trying to profit from the new interest in climate change 
solutions including insurance, adaptation technologies and flood defence.  
 
Figure 3: The Carbon Market5 
REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT 
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In other words, assembling a business case around climate change requires a 
continual reminder of business performance and growth in environmental 
investment that relies less on an external referent – ‘an environmental ontology of 
climate crisis’ (Janković and Bowman, 2013: 252) – than its own internal, 
capitalistic logics. As such, this global assemblage draws legitimacy from climate 
science (as meta-discourse, rather than in specific pronouncements), but does not 
require the practices of green investment to simply be solutions to climate change. 
Rather they have their own logic too which is about growing the economic value 
and performance of environmental business (see Figure 3). So in these practices, 
climate change is cast as a climate that is stable for economic activity whether this 
is by a global optimal climate or an optimal business environment to profit from 
the environmental changes.  
 These practices actively shape an economic and environmental globality. To 
take a rather different example, for some commentators a global issue like climate 
change is a collective problem and therefore needs to be ‘brought home’ to 
encourage individual cultural and behavioral change. Responsibility for 
consumption and self-governance encourages multi-scalar thinking captured in the 
slogan ‘think globally, act locally’. It also expands the scope of action to all 
humankind as drivers of consumption. As a Conservative Member of the U.K. 
Parliament put it: ‘You can’t blame dying forests on slick entrepreneurs and acid 
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rain on Yuppees. Industry exists to meet the demands of the community’.6 
Individualization takes many different forms, but there are some predominant 
commonalities. One common approach is towards encouraging people to change 
behaviors in non-didactic ways. This is perhaps best exemplified in the term 
‘nudge’, which Thaler and Sunstein’s (2009) use to describe ‘libertarian 
paternalist’ interventions. These change the choice architecture through 
intervening in practices or product displays that make it an easier decision to buy 
‘better’ products. Labels on products to represent calculative or technical 
assessments of calories, carbon, ethical trading standards and so on have become a 
key intervention to shape the global responsible citizen. The combination of choice 
and calculation is at the heart of this. In personal carbon allowance proposals, for 
example, as Parag and Strickland (2009) point out, they use the word ‘budgeting’ 
to confirm similarities with financial budgetary management. Carbon can simply 
be organized and managed like finance, diet, alcohol units or other parts of 
people’s everyday lives. There is also an affective engagement particularly in terms 
of what Isin (2004) discusses as the neurotic register. Citizens are to be concerned 
enough to worry about their personal footprints as well as act calculatively to 
manage the risks.  
 Another shared argument is that of household technological changes 
combined with behavioral changes. Common interventions would be choosing 
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more efficient transportation, insulation, turning down thermostats and choosing 
locally produced foods. These technologies and practices however are not just 
about reducing emissions. They have a more complex role in our lifestyles as they 
produce a climate-concerned subject that is to manage climate change 
(Hargreaves, 2014), not least to reduce feelings of planetary guilt. As Mol (2008: 
58) writes: ‘technologies do not subject themselves to what we wish them to do, 
but interfere with who we are’. A focus on individual behavioral change enacts 
practices that in purporting to govern climate change are equally as much about 
encouraging new ways of living (see Figure 4).  
 It is not just a neutral threat of climate change in which behavioral change is 
one of many options to resolve the problem, but rather that climate change is 
modeled and counted by establishing ‘carbon equivalency’ as the commodity that 
is to be managed to save the planet. Climate change is enacted as a problem of 
carbon management, legitimating interventions into better governing the use of 
carbon in people’s lives. The desired outcome of this politics of globality is the 
rational, carbon consumer, who will enable the reduction of carbon-dioxide 
emissions to prevent climate change. In this image, a global citizenship is at stake, 
where the consumer is constituted as a responsible steward of the earth that 
carefully manages the accelerated human impacts on the environment in the 
Anthropocene. Taking care is shaped and re-presented as an ideal modality for 
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living safely in the Anthropocene, albeit it is frequently reduced to an 
individualized, behavioral signal that misses the kinds of ethical reconfigurations 
that others have associated with global citizenship.  
 
Figure 4: The Making of Climate-Concerned Subjects7 
REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT 
 
 The final example concerns the enactment of climate change as a global 
security risk through an assembling of security officials, risk models and the 
legitimating power of rhetoric of threat and fear. For all this seeming authority, 
however, Oels (2014) suggests that there has been rather less in the way of 
dramatic interventions than might be expected from climate change as an 
exceptional state. That said, the security assembling of climate change is 
important, not least given the desire to intervene directly in terms of geo-
engineering (Masco, this volume) or the desire to monitor or govern potentially 
‘dangerous’ populations. Indeed these security practices precisely govern through 
an inter-connected globality in which risks appear from a globally induced cause 
and with global consequences. Governments are not only anticipating potential 
worst-case scenarios but also actively imagining a phantasmagoria that becomes 
real (de Goede and Randalls 2009) as displayed in images, films and discourses 
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about climate change. U.S. and German security reports have explored the kinds of 
risks that might be developing as a result of climate change (see Figure 5). 
Particular places and populations become risky: the North African and Middle 
Eastern water-deprived regions that might foster Islamic radicalism or the 
Bangladeshi migrants fleeing rising waters into neighboring India. 
 
 
Figure 5: The Climate-Security Nexus8  
REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT 
 
 
Climate threats are defined through scientific analysis and modeling, but these are 
not without political assumptions. For example in climate-health research, South 
East Asian countries, unlike European ones, are predicted to have significant 
deaths from malnutrition, primarily because of a modeled assumption that the 
European Union will supply food to all its member states whereas the South East 
Asian countries will be less co-operative with each other (Randalls 2011b).  
 These lists, model outputs and maps become performative, particularly as 
models are increasingly used to adjudicate the success of policy goals. 
Interventions to prevent the radicalization or migration of the climate vulnerable 
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are combined with invocations to enhance food and water security to prevent 
these outcomes and forestall deaths. Yamane (2009) highlights how subsistence 
farmers in Sri Lanka are defined through agro-ecological maps as particularly 
vulnerable to the risks of climate change and in need of developing export-led 
agriculture to reduce their vulnerability. This may work acceptably when the cash 
flows in, but acts to hinder the back-up subsistence economy that also had 
supported these farmers through previous years of poor weather. Ironically, 
interventions to target the security risks of climate change re-engender the same 
kinds of vulnerabilities that they are supposed to be protecting against. 
 The climate-security assemblages not only have an effect on lives, they enact 
new categories (‘the climate migrant’, ‘the vulnerable’, ‘the potential climate-
induced terrorist’) that then re-define a whole set of lives in specific ways 
(Baldwin, 2013). At the same time, climate change becomes dangerous or 
threatening ontologically in a way that will affect Western lifestyles or national 
interests (Kurz et al., 2010). The ‘good’ outcome is a world secured from climate 
change (impacts), but that does not necessarily mean interventions to prevent 
climate change. An alternative can be compensation through insurance 
mechanisms (Stripple, 2012), while a securitized climatic globality prioritizes a 
particular way of exploring environmental risks and their human consequences 
with a focus on intervention (whether in the human or material environment) to 
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deal directly with risky populations and protect the rest of the world. People’s 
ways of life are to be constrained by the interventions to secure the privileged 
individuals ability to continue the right to choose. In this context, the assemblage 
climate change enacts a highly divided and unequal form of globality. 
 
Frictions and Alignments in Climatic Globalities 
One objection that might be raised at this point is that surely these various 
approaches can and do align. In other words they are different representations of 
the same problem (that of global climate change). It is of course quite probable 
that different climate assemblages can work together, but in other cases they will 
come into conflict. Kurz et al. (2010) have shown that ‘maintaining our lifestyles’ is 
one of the most dominant discourses dominating the popular literature related to 
climate change, but it is doubtful whether everyone on the planet is or can be 
gathered around such an invocation.  
 Nevertheless, a good example of this politics of globality can be glanced from 
Funk’s (2014) recent book Windfall exploring the ways in which financial profit 
and security discourse can align. Climate migration actions work both to securitize 
the risks of a dry Sahara for increasing attempts of people to cross to Europe, while 
at the same time governments invest money and expertise in trying to make the 
Sahara productive through forestry projects or by developing large solar energy 
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schemes. Perhaps the best instance of lifestyle management can be seen in the 
rapidly growing green land grabs where entrepreneurs from countries deemed 
vulnerable to climate change buy land elsewhere in the world to ensure the 
continuation of their food supply in a future climate-constrained world. China 
pursued land deals worldwide (indeed, its attempt to extract 3 million acres in 
Madagascar is considered a factor in the political coup there), Qatar sought land in 
Kenya; Kuwait in Cambodia – and so on (these are all detailed in Funk, 2014).  
 Making money aligns with an expropriation of land and a rather fragmented 
global geography of climate change winners and losers that traverses borders in a 
new globality of connections. On the one hand, a stable global economy, 
particularly for oil producing countries, depends on the securitized practices that 
enable the way of life for those in richer countries to continue as before. Yet this 
image of a climate globality seems rather disconnected from the ‘think globally, act 
locally’ slogans of classical environmentalists on the other. Likewise, the profit-
security linkage is distinctly at odds with global policy-making focused on reducing 
CO2 emissions. At a fundamental level, these futures being enacted are in a tense 
relationship with each other. They create ‘friction’ (Mol, 2002), which is in part 
how we know they are enacting very different climate globalities. 
 Second, it is not just that these different practices conflict as they re-shape 
geopolitical borders and economic activities. They also conflict in their 
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fundamental vision of what the ontological problem of climate change is about, as 
well as in their political attempt to secure a future given this ontology (some are 
more empowered than others). In other words, a stable economic climate might 
not be the same as a stable climate or a secure climate or a climate in which 
humans engage in a careful acceptance of precarity (Clark, 2010; Hird, 2010). 
Different problem-framings assemble a global imagination of climate risk through 
different expertise, models, imaginations, concerns and idealized solutions. These 
are partly related to power. For example, the vision of security prompts attention 
on particular risky areas regardless of whether that vulnerability is caused by 
human-induced or natural climatic changes (or climate at all), while for climate 
change adaptation financing, vulnerability to climate change is reworked into 
interventions to make populations economically productive in generating GDP as a 
strategy to resolve these new climate risks. Concurrently, the global economy (as 
the ontological entity at risk) is claimed to be vulnerable to the risks from global 
climate change, but at the same time environmentalist campaigners argue that the 
capitalist economy is the ultimate cause of climate change (the planet as 
ontological entity at risk).  
 For some, climate change cannot be solved without recourse to justice and 
equity, a claim that in turn lies rather unheeded in the argument that the planet 
does not care where CO2 emissions are reduced as it is the global circulation of 
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chemicals that is what matters. Different global imaginaries assemble climate 
change in specific ways and envisage particular interventions to resolve what they 
perceive to be the core problem and ontological entity at risk 
with/through/from/of climate change, interventions that overlap and contradict in 
various ways with other imaginaries of the problem at stake. A just solution may 
not solve the risks of climate to the global capitalist economy, while an 
economically optimal solution may not reduce CO2 emissions, and reducing CO2 
can be done without specific heed to justice or economic concerns.  
 Much also depends on the strength of the networks being built around these 
climate problems (Blok, 2014), as some have more allies than others. Thus the 
argument needs to take account of the importance of power, as certain types of 
ideas, technologies and practices coalesce into concrete enactments of climate 
change while others are excluded, not-enacted. What is fundamentally obscured in 
a ‘one globality’ argument is that each of these assemblages of practices makes 
claims about the nature of the outcome to be achieved, which in turn is irreducibly 
tied to ontological and political-philosophical commitments about the good life. 
Practices compete to define climate change in different ways such that no simple 
reductive resolution is possible.  
 Taking the Anthropocene as a given starting point may stand in the way of 
our need to carefully articulate what kinds of entities, things, people and ecologies 
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are at play in the various enactments of planetary concern, thinking globally or 
assembling climatic globalities. It is important to see these diverse practices as 
enacting and performing different climatic globalities and to see these as 
ontological, epistemological and political-philosophical claims. It is important to 
take seriously claims to engineer an optimal climate for production and 
consumption, as it is also important to take seriously claims that thinking globally 
might open up new ethical and political arrangements. These are not mere ideas 
that float detached from material implications or from powerful organizing bodies 
like neoliberal think tanks. 
 
Conclusions 
While it can be tempting to think of the interconnected natural and social systems 
invoked by the concept of the Anthropocene as enabling a closer interaction and 
recognition of human-environmental relations, I have argued that it would be 
unwise to simply view this as the emergence of a new, universal planetary 
globality. Even in the case of a purportedly global environmental risk like climate 
change, there are a wide variety of ways in which climate change is enacted or 
assembled through different practices, models, technologies and discourses. 
Through the examples of energy efficiency in global cooling and warming debates, 
and the different ways in which contemporary climate change is invoked as a 
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security, economic and individual behavioural issue, I have suggested that these 
different practices assemble rather different climatic globalities in practice. These 
globalities are neither completely separate, nor simply different representations of 
the same object. They have diverse political effects and constitute in different ways 
the ‘goods’ to be achieved and the ‘bads’ to be avoided. As Tsing (2000: 351) 
suggests, we need to ‘reverse this [singular] globalist thinking to turn concerns 
about the global back into researchable questions’ that incorporate ‘critical 
distance’ in our evaluations of global visions. 
 If the idea of a global climate change problem to be solved is so dominant (as 
Hulme, 2009, suggests), what might be gained from thinking about climatic 
globalities as multiple rather than as one totalizing globality? As Mol (2002: 184) 
puts it: ‘Presenting the body multiple as the reality we live with is not a solution to 
a problem, but a way of changing a host of intellectual reflexes’. This is why a 
multiple politics of globality is crucial.  Exploring the diverse assemblings of 
climatic and Anthropocenic globalities resists buying into singular claims about 
environmental change that can only be discussed on their own terms. For example, 
one common climate policy formulation simply states that from an agreement 
about a global mean temperature target and resultant emissions target, it is simply 
a case of putting into place policies designed to reduce emissions to meet that goal. 
This, however, ignores many important questions that one could ask about the 
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kind of lives to be lived and whether this policy ideal is actually embraced in many 
of the other climate change practices, such as those embedded in security or 
behavioural change frames.  
 In other words, a singular climate change global problem framing in which 
climate becomes a resolvable technical issue circumscribes the kinds of debates 
that are crucial for thinking through the planetary implications of a renewed focus 
on climate (Clark 2010; Hird 2010). Planetary thinking must necessarily be 
multiple, laying bare the ways in which globalities are assembled through different 
ideas, artefacts, images and practices. Rather than end up as an enthusiast or critic, 
as occurred with some of the globalization literature, the requirement to 
empirically analyse the multiple ways in which planetary globalities are assembled 
generates the political grounds to assess which of these assemblages to support or 
contest, engage with or resist. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The emergence of planetary images from space, often held up as a key condition 
for the emergence of globality (Poole, 2008), are only relevant within a particular 
cultural and moral reasoning that hints at the value of such a global view (Jasanoff, 
2004).  
2 I will use the term global warming at various points where I wish to emphasize 
that what I am talking about are global warming inspired climate change 
literatures as opposed to global cooling ones. In other places, I will simply use the 
term climate change to designate all types of climatic change. 
3 A similar multiplicity emerges in the dating of the Anthropocene. For Ruddiman 
(2005) the Anthropocene has emerged over thousands of years of human history, 
while Crutzen and Steffen (2003) date its emergence to the development of the 
steam engine in the late eighteenth century, but also suggest that the accelerated 
human impacts since 1950 are central to the Anthropocene. 
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4 Impact Team Report (1977). 
5 This advert from the Climate Group is published in a ‘Low-Carbon leaders’ 
supplement to Environmental Finance in 2005. 
6 Speech by Conservative MP Peter Brooke in October 1988, short transcript; copy 
held by the author. 
7 The advert is from ‘Confronting climate risk’ supplement in Environmental 
Finance in 2007. 
8 Diagram from an Advisory Council report on climate security risks that was 
published through the German government (WBGU, 2007). 
